#### SMT Solving for Nonlinear Theories over the Reals

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Joint Work with Sicun Gao, Soonho Kong, and Jeremy Avigad Special thanks to Lenore Blum for her insightful comments. Method used by most "industrial strength" model checkers:

- uses Boolean encoding for state machine and sets of states.
- can handle much larger designs hundreds of state variables.
- ▶ BDDs traditionally used to represent Boolean functions.

- ► BDDs are a canonical representation. Often become too large.
- Variable ordering must be uniform along paths.
- Selecting right variable ordering very important for obtaining small BDDs.
  - ► Often time consuming or needs manual intervention.
  - ► Sometimes, no space efficient variable ordering exists.

BMC is an alternative approach to symbolic model checking that uses SAT procedures.

- SAT procedures also operate on Boolean expressions but do not use canonical forms.
- ► Do not suffer from the potential space explosion of BDDs.
- Different split orderings possible on different branches.
- Very efficient implementations available.

#### Bounded Model Checking (Clarke, Biere, Cimatti, Zhu)

- Bounded model checking uses a SAT procedure instead of BDDs.
- ► We construct Boolean formula that is satisfiable iff there is a counterexample of length *k*.
- ► We look for longer and longer counterexamples by incrementing the bound k.

- After some number of iterations, we may conclude no counterexample exists and specification holds.
- For example, to verify safety properties, number of iterations is bounded by diameter of finite state machine.

- Bounded model checking finds counterexamples fast. This is due to depth first nature of SAT search procedures.
- It finds counterexamples of minimal length. This feature helps user understand counterexample more easily.

- ► It uses much less space than BDD based approaches.
- Does not need manually selected variable order or costly reordering. Default splitting heuristics usually sufficient.
- Bounded model checking of LTL formulas does not require a tableau or automaton construction.

- ► Implemented a tool BMC in 1999.
- It accepts a subset of the SMV language.
- ► Given k, BMC outputs a formula that is satisfiable iff counterexample exists of length k.
- If counterexample exists, a standard SAT solver generates a truth assignment for the formula.

- There are many examples where BMC significantly outperforms BDD based model checking.
- In some cases BMC detects errors instantly, while SMV fails to construct BDD for initial state.
- ► Armin's example: Circuit with 9510 latches, 9499 inputs. BMC formula has 4 × 10<sup>6</sup> variables, 1.2 × 10<sup>7</sup> clauses. Shortest bug of length 37 found in 69 seconds.

- ► We use linear temporal logic (LTL) for specifications.
- Basic LTL operators: next time 'X' globally 'G' release 'R'

 $\begin{array}{ll} \textit{eventuality} & `\mathbf{F}' \\ \textit{until} & `\mathbf{U}' \end{array}$ 

- Only consider existential LTL formulas  $\mathbf{E}f$ , where
  - $\blacktriangleright~{\bf E}$  is the existential path quantifier, and
  - f is a temporal formula with no path quantifiers.
- ► Finding a witness for Ef is equivalent to finding a counterexample for A¬f.

- ▶ System described as a Kripke structure  $M = (S, I, T, \ell)$ , where
  - $\blacktriangleright\ S$  is a finite set of states and I a set of initial states,
  - T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation, (We assume every state has a successor state.)
  - $\ell \colon S \to \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$  is the state labeling.

#### The Microwave Oven Example





- ► In symbolic model checking, a state is represented by a vector of state variables s = (s(1),...,s(n)).
- ▶ We define propositional formulas  $f_I(s)$ ,  $f_T(s,t)$  and  $f_p(s)$  as follows:
  - $f_I(s)$  iff  $s \in I$ ,
  - $f_T(s,t)$  iff  $(s,t) \in T$ , and
  - $f_p(s)$  iff  $p \in \ell(s)$ .
- We write T(s,t) instead of  $f_T(s,t)$ , etc.

- If  $\pi = (s_0, s_1, \ldots)$ , then  $\pi(i) = s_i$  and  $\pi^i = (s_i, s_{i+1}, \ldots)$ .
- $\pi$  is a path if  $\pi(i) \to \pi(i+1)$  for all i.
- ▶ Ef is true in M ( $M \models Ef$ ) iff there is a path  $\pi$  in M with  $\pi \models f$  and  $\pi(0) \in I$ .
- Model checking is the problem of determining the truth of an LTL formula in a Kripke structure. Equivalently,

Does a witness exist for the LTL formula?

- ▶ Diameter d: Least number of steps to reach all reachable states. If the property holds for k ≥ d, the property holds for all reachable states.
- ► Finding *d* is computationally hard:
  - ▶ State *s* is reachable in *j* steps:

$$R_j(s) := \exists s_0, \dots, s_j : s = s_j \land I(s_0) \land \bigwedge_{i=0}^{j-1} T(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

 $\blacktriangleright$  Thus, k is greater or equal than the diameter d if

$$\forall s : R_{k+1}(s) \Longrightarrow \exists j \le k : R_j(s)$$

This requires an efficient QBF checker!

# The Cyber-Physical Challenge

- ► Complex aerospace, automotive, biological systems.
- ► They combine discrete and continuous behaviors.
- Many are safety-critical.



# Bounded Model Checking for Hybrid Automata

- Hybrid automata [Henzinger 1996] are widely used to model cyber-physical systems.
- ► They combine finite automata with continuous dynamical systems.
- Grand challenge for formal verification!
  - Reachability for simple systems is undecidable.
  - Existing tools do not scale on realistic systems.

# Hybrid Systems

 $\mathcal{H} = \langle X, Q, \mathsf{Init}, \mathsf{Flow}, \mathsf{Jump} \rangle$ 

- A continuous space  $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$  and a finite set of modes Q.
- Init  $\subseteq Q \times X$ : initial configurations
- Flow: continuous flows
  - Each mode q is equipped with differential equations  $\frac{d\vec{x}}{dt} = \vec{f}_q(\vec{x}, t)$ .
- Jump: discrete jumps
  - ► The system can be switched from (q, x) to (q', x'), resetting modes and variables.



# Reachability for Continuous Systems

Single differential equation case:

- Continuous Dynamics:  $\frac{d\vec{x}(t)}{dt} = \vec{f}(\vec{x}(t), t)$ 
  - The solution curve:

$$\alpha : \mathbb{R} \to X, \ \alpha(t) = \alpha(0) + \int_0^t \vec{f}(\alpha(s), s) ds.$$

• Define the predicate  $\llbracket \mathsf{Flow}(\vec{x}_0, t, \vec{x}) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{M}} = \{ (\vec{x}_0, t, \vec{x}) : \alpha(0) = \vec{x}_0, \alpha(t) = \vec{x} \}$ 

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- Reachability: Is it possible to reach an unsafe state from an initial state following trajectory of differential equations?
  - ►  $\exists \vec{x}_0, \vec{x}, t. (\mathsf{Init}(\vec{x}_0) \land \mathsf{Flow}(\vec{x}_0, t, \vec{x}) \land \mathsf{Unsafe}(\vec{x})) ?$

#### Reachability for Hybrid Systems

Combining continuous and discrete behaviors, we can encode bounded reachability:

• " $\vec{x}$  is reachable after after 0 discrete jumps":

 $\mathsf{Reach}^0(\vec{x}) := \exists \vec{x}_0, t. \; [\mathsf{Init}(\vec{x}_0) \land \mathsf{Flow}(\vec{x}_0, t, \vec{x})]$ 

- ► Inductively, " $\vec{x}$  is reachable after k + 1 discrete jumps" is definable as: Reach<sup>k+1</sup>( $\vec{x}$ ) :=  $\exists \vec{x}_k, \vec{x}'_k, t$ . [Reach<sup>k</sup>( $\vec{x}_k$ )  $\land$  Jump( $\vec{x}_k, \vec{x}'_k$ )  $\land$  Flow( $\vec{x}'_k, t, \vec{x}$ )]
- Unsafe within n discrete jumps:

$$\exists \vec{x}. \ (\bigvee_{i=0}^{n} \mathsf{Reach}^{i}(\vec{x}) \land \mathsf{Unsafe}(\vec{x})) \ ?$$

# A Major Obstacle

We have shown how to use first-order formulas over the real numbers to encode formal verification problems for hybrid automata.

- Need to decide the truth value of formulas, which include nonlinear real functions.
  - Polynomials
  - Exponentiation and trigonometric functions
  - Solutions of ODEs, mostly no closed forms
- ► High complexity for polynomials; undecidable for either sin or cos.

# Connection to Type 2 Computability

- Negative results put a limit on symbolic decision procedures for the theory over nonlinear real functions.
- In practice (control engineering, scientific computing) these functions are routinely computed numerically.
- Can we use numerical algorithms to decide logic formulas over the reals?

#### Computable Real Numbers

A real number a ∈ ℝ is computable if it has a name γ<sub>a</sub> : N → Q that is a total computable function.



- Not all reals are computable!
  - There are only countably many Turing machines while there are uncountably many real numbers.

#### Quote from Turing's 1936 Paper

- "Equally easy to define and investigate computable functions of an integral variable or a real or computable variable."
  - A. M. Turing, On Computable Numbers with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, Proceedings of the London Math Society, 1936.
- A real function f is computable, if there exists a Type 2 Turing Machine that maps any name γ<sub>a</sub> of a to a name γ<sub>f(a)</sub> of f(a).

# Type 2 Turing Machines

A Type 2 Turing Machine extends an ordinary (Type 1) Turing Machine in the following way.

- Both the input tapes are infinite and read-only.
- The output tape is infinite and one-way.



# Connection to Type 2 Computability

- Type 2 computability gives a theoretical model of numerical computation.
  - ▶ exp, sin, ODEs are all Type 2 computable functions.
- We have developed a special type of decision procedure for first-order theories over the reals with Type 2 computable functions.
  - ► [Gao, Avigad, Clarke LICS2012, IJCAR2012].

#### Perturbations on Logic Formulas

Satisfiability of quantifier-free formulas under numerical perturbations:

Consider any formula

$$\varphi: \ \bigwedge_i (\bigvee_j f_{ij}(\vec{x}) = 0)$$

Inequalities are turned into interval bounds on slack variables.

For any δ ∈ Q<sup>+</sup>, let c be a constant vector satisfying ||c||<sub>max</sub> ≤ δ.
 A δ-perturbation on φ is the formula:

$$\varphi^{\vec{c}}: \bigwedge_{i} (\bigvee_{j} f_{ij}(\vec{x}) = c_{ij})$$

# The $\delta$ -Decision Problem

We developed a decision procedure using numerical techniques (with an error bound  $\delta$ ) that guarantees:

- If  $\varphi$  is decided as "unsatisfiable", then it is indeed unsatisfiable.
- If  $\varphi$  is decided as " $\delta$ -satisfiable", then:

Under some  $\delta$ -perturbation  $\vec{c}$ ,  $\varphi^{\vec{c}}$  is satisfiable.

If a decision procedure satisfies this property, we say it is " $\delta$ -complete".

# Decidability and Complexity

- The delta-decision problem is decidable for bounded first-order formulas over arbitrary Type 2 computable functions.
- ► Complexity: (using [Ko 1991, Weihrauch 2000, Kawamura 2010])
  - ▶ **NP**-complete for existential formulas in  $\{+, \times, \exp, \sin, ...\}$ .
  - ► **PSPACE**-complete for existential formulas with ODEs.
- Note the difference: The strict decision problems are all undecidable for these signatures.
- This is not bad news: Modern SAT/SMT solvers can often handle many NP-complete problems in practice.

# Delta-Complete Bounded Model Checking

Recall that when bounded model checking a hybrid system  $\mathcal{H}$ , we ask if  $\varphi : \operatorname{Reach}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\leq n}(\vec{x}) \wedge \operatorname{Unsafe}(\vec{x})$  is satisfiable.



#### Practical tool: dReal

#### Our solver dReal is open-source at dreal.cs.cmu.edu.



#### dReal

- Nonlinear signatures including exp, sin, etc., and Lipschitz-continuous ODEs.
- $\delta$ -Complete and correctness proofs are provided.
- Tight integration of DPLL(T), interval arithmetic, constraint solving, reliable integration, etc.

#### Example: Kepler Conjecture Benchmarks

- ► Around 1000 formulas. Huge combinations of nonlinear terms.
- dReal solves over 95% of the formulas. (5-min timeout each)





Among golf formulae, we have 864 UNSATs, 45 & SATs ( $\delta = 10^{-3}$ ), and  $\gamma$  Timeouts (= 5mins). We were able to verify 92 instances of the 864 UNSAT results. All the experiments below are run on a machine of with a 48-core 2.2GHz AMD Opteron Processor and 512GB of RAM.

| Filename | Formula ID |              | Solving<br>Time<br>(sec) | # of<br>Vars | # of<br>Arith<br>Op | # of<br>Non-<br>poly Op | Proof Size<br>(byte) | Result | Proof<br>Checked | # of<br>Proved<br>Axioms | # of<br>Subproblems<br>Generated | Proof<br>Checking<br>Time<br>(sec) | # of<br>Proof<br>Checking<br>Depths |
|----------|------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 785      |            | 9414951439   | 0:00.01                  | 6            | 80                  | 1                       | 951                  | unsat  | v                | 3245                     | 3244                             | 234.950                            | 9                                   |
| 814      |            | 181212899 0  | 0:00.01                  | 6            | 95                  | 1                       | 1020                 | unsat  | v                | 2019                     | 2018                             | 187.250                            | 9                                   |
| 903      |            | 5766053833   | 0:00.25                  | 6            | 2722                | 24                      | 20081                | unsat  | v                | 414                      | 413                              | 146.230                            | 9                                   |
| 815      |            | 181212899 1  | 0:00.01                  | 6            | 95                  | 1                       | 1020                 | unsat  | v                | 2001                     | 2000                             | 123.440                            | 9                                   |
| 896      |            | 7720405539   | 0:00.27                  | 6            | 2711                | 24                      | 20024                | unsat  | v                | 209                      | 208                              | 107.800                            | 9                                   |
| 811      |            | 4491491732   | 0:00.26                  | 6            | 2731                | 24                      | 20190                | unsat  | v                | 180                      | 179                              | 106.670                            | 9                                   |
| 771      |            | 9563139965 e | 0:00.27                  | 6            | 2709                | 24                      | 20021                | unsat  | v                | 222                      | 221                              | 82.500                             | 9                                   |

- The cardiac-cell model is a hybrid system that contains nonlinear differential equations.
  - No existing formal analysis tool can analyze this model.
- The unsafe states of the model lead to serious cardiac disorder.



► Using our tool dReal, we check the safety property "globally u < θ<sub>v</sub>".

"When the property is violated, the cardiac cells lose excitability, which would trigger a spiral rotation of electrical wave and break up into a disordered collection of spirals (fibrillation)."



Counterexample found by dReal, confirmed by experimental data.

The formulas we solved contain over 200 highly nonlinear ODEs and over 600 variables.



# Conclusion

- Turing's original goal of understanding numerical computation has become important in design and analysis of cyber-physical systems.
- We can utilize the notion of computability over the reals in formal verification of such systems.
- ► Practical solver: dReal (open-source at dreal.cs.cmu.edu).
- Current applications:
  - Completing formal proofs for the Kepler Conjecture
  - Finding parameters for cancer treatment models
  - Verifying safety of autonomous vehicles